Conflicting appearances, necessity and the irreducibility of propositions about colours

Abstract
Parts I and II of 'Conflicting Appearances, Necessity and the Irreducibility of Propositions about Colours' review the argument from 'conflicting appearances' for the view that nothing has any one colour. I take further a well-known criticism of the argument made by Austin and Burnyeat. In Part III I undertake the task of positive construction, offering a theory of what it is that all things coloured a particular colour have in common. I end, in Part IV, by arguing that the resulting 'colour phenomenalism', rather than physicalism, is required to give a satisfactory account of the necessity of Wittgenstein's 'puzzle propositions' about colour
Keywords Appearance  Color  Epistemology  Necessity  Proposition  Wittgenstein, Ludwig
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Clare Batty (2009). What's That Smell? Southern Journal of Philosophy 47 (4):321-348.

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