David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (2):219-235 (2005)
Parts I and II of 'Conflicting Appearances, Necessity and the Irreducibility of Propositions about Colours' review the argument from 'conflicting appearances' for the view that nothing has any one colour. I take further a well-known criticism of the argument made by Austin and Burnyeat. In Part III I undertake the task of positive construction, offering a theory of what it is that all things coloured a particular colour have in common. I end, in Part IV, by arguing that the resulting 'colour phenomenalism', rather than physicalism, is required to give a satisfactory account of the necessity of Wittgenstein's 'puzzle propositions' about colour
|Keywords||Appearance Color Epistemology Necessity Proposition Wittgenstein, Ludwig|
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Pendaran Roberts & Kelly Ann Schmidtke (forthcoming). Relationalism About Perceptible Properties and the Principle of Charity. Synthese:1-25.
Pendaran Roberts, James Andow & Kelly Schmidtke (2014). Colour Relationalism and the Real Deliverances of Introspection. Erkenntnis 79 (5):1173-1189.
Pendaran Roberts (2014). Parsing the Rainbow. Synthese 191 (8):1793-1811.
Pendaran Roberts & Kelly Schmidtke (2012). In Defense of Incompatibility, Objectivism, and Veridicality About Color. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (4):547-558.
David R. Hilbert & Alex Byrne (2007). Color Primitivism. Erkenntnis 66 (1/2):73 - 105.
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