David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
In J.-C. Merle (ed.), Reading Kant’s Doctrine of Right (forthcoming)
Gauthier’s contractarianism begins with an idea of a rational deliberator but ‘finds no basis for postulating a moral need for the justification of one’s actions to others. The role of agreement is to address each person’s demand that the constraints of society be justified to him, not a concern that he justify himself to his fellows’ (Gauther 1997, 134–5). He contrasts his view with Scanlon’s contractualism, according to which agreement with others is the core of morality and each agent has the burden of justifying his or her actions to others. Both of their views count as ‘constructivist’ because they reject moral realism and hold that normativity is a function of what we do, either individually or collectively. Kant’s Rechtslehre is neutral regarding moral realism and yet constructivist about moral norms. However, the relevant acts basic to Gauthier’s and Scanlon’s views concern voluntary agreements we make. Using agreement to establish basic norms faces some serious difficulties. Kant’s Rechtslehre avoids these problems by showing how basic social norms can be identified and justified independently of voluntary agreement. Moreover, it does so in a way that shows that an individual’s justification of his or her acts to others and the justification of the acts of others to any individual are inseparable aspects of one and the same justificatory reasons in which voluntary agreement plays no role.
|Keywords||Contradiction in Conception Test Contractarianism David Gauthier|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Nicholas Southwood (2008). A Deliberative Model of Contractualism. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 7 (2):183-208.
Peter Vallentyne (ed.) (1991). Contractarianism and Rational Choice: Essays on David Gauthier's Morals by Agreement. Cambridge University Press.
Peter Vallentyne (1989). Contractarianism and the Assumption of Mutual Unconcern. Philosophical Studies 56 (2):187 - 192.
Georgia Testa (2003). Gauthier and the Capacity for Morality. Res Publica 9 (3):223-242.
David P. Gauthier (1986). Morals by Agreement. Oxford University Press.
Holly Smith (1991). Deriving Morality From Rationality. In Peter Vallentyne (ed.), Contractarianism and Rational choice: Essays on David Gauthier's Morals by Agreement. Cambridge University Press
Kenneth R. Westphal (2011). Kant’s [Moral] Constructivism and Rational Justification. In Pihlström & Williams Baiasu (ed.), Politics and Metaphysics in Kant. Wales University Press
Samuel Freeman (2007). The Burdens of Public Justification: Constructivism, Contractualism, and Publicity. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 6 (1):5-43.
Daniel M. Farrell (1993). Book Review:Contractarianism and Rational Choice: Essays on David Gauthier's "Morals by Agreement." Peter Vallentyne. [REVIEW] Ethics 103 (2):385-.
Joe Mintoff (1997). Rational Cooperation, Intention, and Reconsideration. Ethics 107 (4):612-643.
J. David Velleman (1997). Deciding How to Decide. In Garrett Cullity & Berys Nigel Gaut (eds.), Ethics and Practical Reason. Oxford University Press 29--52.
Jody S. Kraus (1993). The Limits of Hobbesian Contractarianism. Cambridge University Press.
Robert Bass (2000). Pure Contractarianism: Promise, Problems, Prospects. Journal of Value Inquiry 34 (2-3):319-332.
Jean Hampton (2007). The Intrinsic Worth of Persons: Contractarianism in Moral and Political Philosophy. Cambridge University Press.
Joe Mintoff (1996). On a Problem for Contractarianism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (1):98 – 116.
Added to index2012-03-11
Total downloads69 ( #69,305 of 1,932,541 )
Recent downloads (6 months)13 ( #66,503 of 1,932,541 )
How can I increase my downloads?