David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophers' Imprint 9 (10) (2009)
In this paper I develop a conception of joint practical deliberation as a special type of shared cooperative activity, through which co-deliberators jointly accept reasons as applying to them as a pair or group. I argue, moreover, that the aspiration to deliberative “pairhood” is distinguished by a special concern for mutuality that guides each deliberator’s readiness to accept a given consideration as a reason-for-us. It matters to each of us, as joint deliberators, that each party’s (individual) reasons for accepting something as a reason-for-us support a conception of our relationship as one characterized by mutual, non-instrumental concern for one another
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Stephen Darwall (2011). Being With. Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (s1):4–24.
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Evan Simpson (2013). Reasonable Trust. European Journal of Philosophy 21 (3):402-423.
Abraham Sesshu Roth (2014). Prediction, Authority, and Entitlement in Shared Activity. Noûs 48 (4):626-652.
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