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  • Brad Weslake, Exclusion Excluded.
    I argue that an independently attractive account of causation and causal explanation provides a principled resolution of the exclusion problem.
    The Exclusion Problem in Philosophy of Mind
    Causal Overdetermination in Metaphysics
    Causal Closure of the Physical in Metaphysics
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  • 143.1Jesper Kallestrup (2006). The Causal Exclusion Argument. Philosophical Studies 131 (2):459-85.
    Jaegwon Kim’s causal exclusion argument says that if all physical effects have sufficient physical causes, and no physical effects are caused twice over by distinct physical and mental causes, there cannot be any irreducible mental causes. In addition, Kim has argued that the nonreductive physicalist must give up completeness, and embrace the possibility of downward causation. This paper argues first that this extra argument relies on a principle of property individuation, which the nonreductive physicalist need not accept, and second that (...) once we get clear on overdetermination, there is a way to reject the exclusion principle upon which the causal exclusion argument depends, but third that this should not lead to the belief that mental causation is easily accounted for in terms of counterfactual dependencies. (shrink)
    The Exclusion Problem in Philosophy of Mind
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  • 142.6Panu Raatikainen, Causation, Exclusion, and the Special Sciences.
    The issue of downward causation (and mental causation in particular), and the exclusion problem is discussed by taking into account some recent advances in the philosophy of science. The problem is viewed from the perspective of the new interventionist theory of causation developed by Woodward. It is argued that from this viewpoint, a higher-level (e.g., mental) state can sometimes truly be causally relevant, and moreover, that the underlying physical state which realizes it may fail to be such.
    Mental Causation, Misc in Philosophy of Mind
    Downward Causation in Metaphysics
    The Exclusion Problem in Philosophy of Mind
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  • 138.7Terence E. Horgan (2001). Causal Compatibilism and the Exclusion Problem. Theoria 16 (40):95-116.
    Terry Horgan University of Memphis In this paper I address the problem of causal exclusion, specifically as it arises for mental properties (although the scope of the discussion is more general, being applicable to other kinds of putatively causal properties that are not identical to narrowly physical causal properties, i.e., causal properties posited by physics). I summarize my own current position on the matter, and I offer a defense of this position. I draw upon and synthesize relevant discussions in various (...) <blockquote> [1] </blockquote> other papers of mine (some collaborative) that bear on this topic. (shrink)
    The Exclusion Problem in Philosophy of Mind
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  • 137.7Larry Shapiro, Lessons From Causal Exclusion.
    “Let us now turn to an argument designed to show that mind-body supervenience itself leads to apparent difficulties with mental causation,” says Kim (1998: 39). This is something of a reversal, for Kim (1984: 103) had earlier argued that supervenient causation is a legitimate form of causation. I prefer Kim’s earlier way of thinking. The problem that Kim, in his more recent writings, sees emerging from supervenience is that of causal exclusion. But I think that supervenience by itself does not (...) entail causal exclusion. Belief that it does betrays a metaphysical prejudice that some empirically-informed reflection may help remove. In this paper I take an empirical perspective toward Kim’s arguments for causal exclusion and conclude that, from this perspective, supervenience does not have the dire consequences for causal explanation in the specials sciences that Kim thinks it does. (shrink)
    Mental Causation in Philosophy of Mind
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  • 133.7Janez Bregant (2004). Van Gulick's Solution of the Exclusion Problem Revisited. Acta Analytica 19 (33):83-94.
    The anti-reductionist who wants to preserve the causal efficacy of mental phenomena faces several problems in regard to mental causation, i.e. mental events which cause other events, arising from her desire to accept the ontological primacy of the physical and at the same time save the special character of the mental. Psychology tries to persuade us of the former, appealing thereby to the results of experiments carried out in neurology; the latter is, however, deeply rooted in our everyday actions and (...) beliefs and despite the constant opposition of science still very much alive. Difficulties, however, arise from a combination of two claims that are widely accepted in philosophy of mind, namely, physical monism and mental realism, the acceptance of which leads us to the greatest problem of mental causation: the problem of causal exclusion. Since physical causes alone are always sufficient for physical effects mental properties are excluded from causal explanations of our behaviour, which makes them “epiphenomenal”. The article introduces Van Gulick’s solution to the exclusion problem which tries to prove that physical properties, in contrast to mental properties, do not have as much of a privileged status with respect to event causation as usually ascribed. Therefore, it makes no sense to say that physical properties are causally relevant whereas mental properties are not. This is followed by my objection to his argument for levelling mental and physical properties with respect to causation of events. I try to show that Van Gulick’s argument rests on a premise that no serious physicalist can accept. (shrink)
    The Exclusion Problem in Philosophy of Mind
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  • 133.1 Istv (2008). Excluding Exclusion: The Natural(Istic) Dualist Approach. Philosophical Explorations 11 (1):67 – 78.
    The exclusion problem for mental causation is one of the most discussed puzzles in the mind-body literature. There has been a general agreement among philosophers, especially because most of them are committed to some form of physicalism, that the dualist cannot escape the exclusion problem. I argue that a proper understanding of dualism - its form, commitments, and intuitions - makes the exclusion problem irrelevant from a dualist perspective. The paper proposes a dualist approach, based on a theory of event (...) causation, according to which events are medium-grained, namely parsed into mental and physical property components. A theory of contrastive mental causation is built upon this theory of events, for which the problem of exclusion does not arise. (shrink)
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  • 132.6István Aranyosi (2008). Excluding Exclusion: The Natural(Istic) Dualist Approach. Philosophical Explorations 11 (1):67-78.
    The exclusion problem for mental causation is one of the most discussed puzzles in the mind-body literature. There has been a general agreement among philosophers, especially because most of them are committed to some form of physicalism, that the dualist cannot escape the exclusion problem. I argue that a proper understanding of dualism --its form, commitments, and intuitions?makes the exclusion problem irrelevant from a dualist perspective. The paper proposes a dualist approach, based on a theory of event causation, according to (...) which events are medium-grained, namely, parsed into mental and physical property components. A theory of contrastive mental causation is built upon this theory of events, for which the problem of exclusion does not arise. (shrink)
    Mental Causation in Philosophy of Mind
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  • 131.3James Woodward (2008). Mental Causation and Neural Mechanisms. In Jakob Hohwy & Jesper Kallestrup (eds.), Being Reduced: New Essays on Reduction, Explanation, and Causation. Oxford University Press.
    This paper discusses some issues concerning the relationship between the mental and the physical, including the so-called causal exclusion argument, within the framework of a broadly interventionist approach to causation.
    Causal Closure of the Physical in Metaphysics
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  • 131.2Ned Block (2003). Do Causal Powers Drain Away. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (1):133-150.
    In this note, I will discuss one issue concerning the main argument of Mind in a Physical World (Kim, 1998), the Causal Exclusion Argument. The issue is whether it is a consequence of the Causal Exclusion Argument that all macro level causation (that is, causation above the level of fundamental physics) is an illusion, with all of the apparent causal powers of mental and other macro properties draining into the bottom level of physics. I will argue that such a consequence (...) would give us reason to reject the Causal Exclusion Argument. But there is also a stronger challenge, the charge that, if there is no bottom level of physics, the Causal Exclusion Argument has the consequence that “causal powers would drain away into a bottomless pit and there wouldn’t be any causation anywhere.” (81--page numbers that are not attributed to other works are to Kim, 1998). (shrink)
    Mental Causation in Philosophy of Mind
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  • 124.5Janez Bregant (2003). The Problem of Causal Exclusion and Horgan's Causal Compatibilism. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 3 (9):305-320.
    Mental Causation in Philosophy of Mind
    Compatibilism in Philosophy of Action
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