Is there a modal fallacy in van Inwagen's 'First Formal Argument'?

Analysis 72 (1):36-41 (2012)
The argument given by Peter van Inwagen for the second premise on his "First Formal Argument" in An Essay on Free Will is invalid. The second premise hinges on the principle that since a proposition p , some statement about the present, is actually true, ~p can't be true. ~p must be false. What is the reason? The principle is that ~p cannot be true at the same time as p . I argue that, among other things, in its attachment to this sort of principle, van Inwagen's argument commits the most familiar of all the modal scope fallacies
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DOI 10.1093/analys/anr138
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