‘On Hegel’s Early Critique of Kant’s Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science’.
Graduate studies at Western
In S. Houlgate (ed.), Hegel and the Philosophy of Nature. SUNY (1998)
|Abstract||In 1801 Hegel charged that, on Kant’s analysis, forces are ‘either purely ideal, in which case they are not forces, or else they are transcendent’. I argue that this objection, which Hegel did not spell out, reveals an important and fundamental line of internal criticism of Kant’s Critical philosophy. I show that Kant’s basic forces of attraction and repulsion, which constitute matter, are merely ideal because Kant’s arguments for them are circular and beg the question, and they have no determinate connection to any of the basic forces of Newtonian physics. Hence they are mere Gedankendinge. I argue further, that real physical forces transcend Kant’s analysis by showing that his proof of Newton’s law of inertia is unsound. I then show that this apparently specific disagreement underlies the enormous philosophical shift from Kant’s anti-naturalist transcendental idealism to Hegel’s naturalistic use of regressive, quasi-transcendental arguments.|
|Keywords||causal realism transcendental idealism Kant's theory of matter Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science|
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