David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):785-797 (2013)
If counterfactual dependence is sufficient for causation and if omissions can be causes, then all events have many more causes than common sense tends to recognize. This problem is standardly addressed by appeal to pragmatics. However, Carolina Sartorio  has recently raised what I shall argue is a more interesting problem concerning omissions for counterfactual theories of causation—more interesting because it demands a more subtle pragmatic solution. I discuss the relationship between the idea that causes are proportional to their effects, the idea that causation is contrastive, and the question of the dimensions along which causal explanations should be evaluated with respect to one another.
|Keywords||Causation Omissions Contrast Explanation Proportionality Counterfactuals Pragmatics|
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References found in this work BETA
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Citations of this work BETA
Neil McDonnell (2015). The Deviance in Deviant Causal Chains. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 4 (2):162-170.
Sara Bernstein (2014). Two Problems for Proportionality About Omissions. Dialectica 68 (3):429-441.
Sara Bernstein (2015). The Metaphysics of Omissions. Philosophy Compass 10 (3):208-218.
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