Perspectives on the dispute between intuitionistic and classical mathematics

In Christer Svennerlind (ed.), Ursus Philosophicus. Essays dedicated to Björn Haglund on his sixtieth birthday. Philosophical Communications (2004)
Abstract
It is not unreasonable to think that the dispute between classical and intuitionistic mathematics might be unresolvable or 'faultless', in the sense of there being no objective way to settle it. If so, we would have a pretty case of relativism. In this note I argue, however, that there is in fact not even disagreement in any interesting sense, let alone a faultless one, in spite of appearances and claims to the contrary. A position I call classical pluralism is sketched, intended to provide a coherent methodological stance towards the issue. Some reasons to recommend this stance are given, as well as some speculations as to why not everyone might want to follow the recommendation.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index Translate to english
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 11,819
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Similar books and articles
Stewart Shapiro (ed.) (1985). Intentional Mathematics. Sole Distributors for the U.S.A. And Canada, Elsevier Science Pub. Co..
Daniel Dzierzgowski (1995). Models of Intuitionistic TT and N. Journal of Symbolic Logic 60 (2):640-653.
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2012-11-25

Total downloads

6 ( #211,551 of 1,099,914 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

1 ( #304,017 of 1,099,914 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.