Perspectives on the dispute between intuitionistic and classical mathematics

In Christer Svennerlind (ed.), Ursus Philosophicus. Essays dedicated to Björn Haglund on his sixtieth birthday. Philosophical Communications (2004)
It is not unreasonable to think that the dispute between classical and intuitionistic mathematics might be unresolvable or 'faultless', in the sense of there being no objective way to settle it. If so, we would have a pretty case of relativism. In this note I argue, however, that there is in fact not even disagreement in any interesting sense, let alone a faultless one, in spite of appearances and claims to the contrary. A position I call classical pluralism is sketched, intended to provide a coherent methodological stance towards the issue. Some reasons to recommend this stance are given, as well as some speculations as to why not everyone might want to follow the recommendation.
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