Realizing ‘Political’ Neutrality
Law and Philosophy 30 (5):541-573 (2011)
| Abstract | Political liberalism is supposed to be neutral among reasonable comprehensive doctrines, including comprehensive liberalism. Some critics think that it implicitly assumes comprehensive liberalism. I argue that political liberalism has the resources to avoid this charge and chart a path between sectarianism and unprincipled accommodation that allows a range of policy justifications onto the political agenda of a scope that honors the ideal of neutrality | |||||||||
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