Rethinking Relational Autonomy

Hypatia 24 (4):26 - 49 (2009)
Abstract
John Christman has argued that constitutively relational accounts of autonomy, as defended by some feminist theorists, are problematically perfectionist about the human good. I argue that autonomy is constitutively relational, but not in a way that implies perfectionism: autonomy depends on a dialogical disposition to hold oneself answerable to external, critical perspectives on one's action-guiding commitments. This type of relationality carries no substantive value commitments, yet it does answer to core feminist concerns about autonomy
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    References found in this work BETA
    Michael E. Bratman (2003). Autonomy and Hierarchy. Social Philosophy and Policy 20 (2):156-176.
    Michael E. Bratman (2001). Two Problems About Human Agency. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 101 (3):309–326.

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    Citations of this work BETA
    Elizabeth Ben-Ishai (2012). Responding to Vulnerability: The Case of Injection Drug Use. International Journal of Feminist Approaches to Bioethics 5 (2):39-63.
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