Selflessness and responsibility for self: Is deference compatible with autonomy?
Philosophical Review 112 (4):483-523 (2003)
| Abstract | She was intensely sympathetic. She was immensely charming. She excelled in the difficult arts of family life. She sacrificed herself daily. If there was chicken, she took the leg, if there was a draught, she sat in it—in short, she was so constituted that she never had a mind or wish of her own, but preferred to sympathise always with the minds and wishes of others. — Virginia Woolf (1979, 59). | |||||||||
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