David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Analysis 72 (4):746-748 (2012)
A central argument for the view that God's necessary omniscience [( Bgf p )] precludes freewill is unsound, because the necessity of the consequence is not the necessity of the consequent, and nor is Bgf true. God's belief in some particular proposition f about what I will do is not necessary, as I might do something that makes ~ f true. Fischer and Tognazzini claim that this counterargument argument assumes that I must freely do the something that makes f true. But plainly it doesn't. All that it assumes is that I will do the something that makes f true. It makes no difference whether I do that thing unfreely, or "deterministicall". The argument does not assume the existence of a case of freewill in the face of divine foreknowledge, but instead considers the necessity of God's belief in some particular designated proposition f. The argument does not depend, as Fischer and Tognazzini suppose, on whether God's knowledge is a function of the facts (omniscience) or vice versa (infallibility)
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References found in this work BETA
Storrs McCall (2011). The Supervenience of Truth: Freewill and Omniscience. Analysis 71 (3):501-506.
Trenton Merricks (2009). Truth and Freedom. Philosophical Review 118 (1):29-57.
Citations of this work BETA
J. M. Fischer & N. A. Tognazzini (2013). The Logic of Theological Incompatibilism: A Reply to Westphal. Analysis 73 (1):46-48.
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