Law and Philosophy 18 (3):271-296 (1999)
|Abstract||Public reason is supposed to enable the enforcement of the conditions of a distinctively liberal ideal of autonomy on grounds acceptable to all citizens. After sketching the abstract concept of public reason, this paper sets out several conceptions of that ideal, in order to show that the logic of the public reason project carries it toward the sectarian politics it seeks to avoid.|
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