David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Erkenntnis 58 (3):379 - 414 (2003)
This paper argues that there is no possible structural way of drawing a distinction between objects of different types, such as individuals and properties of different adicities and orders. We show first that purely combinatorial information (information about how objects combine to form states of affairs) is not sufficient for doing this. We show that for any set of such combinatorial data there is always more than one way of typing them – that is, there are always several ways of classifying the different constituents of states of affairs as individuals and properties. Therefore, contrary to received ontological opinion, no object is essentially of any specific type. In the second part we argue that taking into account logical information does not help either, since logic presupposes the very distinction we are trying to draw. Furthermore, this distinction is not even essential for logic, since logic can function perfectly well without it. We conclude that certain distinctions which have been traditionally regarded as ontologically basic (such as that between individuals and properties) cannot be as fundamental as is often supposed.
|Keywords||Metaphysics Ontology Categories Types Structuralism|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Samir Okasha (2002). Underdetermination, Holism and the Theory/Data Distinction. Philosophical Quarterly 52 (208):303-319.
Antigone M. Nounou (forthcoming). Kinds of Objects and Varieties of Properties. In Elaine Landry & Dean Rickles (eds.), Structures, Objects and Causality. Springer.
Athanassios Raftopoulos & Vincent C. Müller (2006). The Phenomenal Content of Experience. Mind and Language 21 (2):187-219.
Sonia Roca-Royes (2011). Essentialism Vis-à-Vis Possibilia, Modal Logic, and Necessitism. Philosophy Compass 6 (1):54-64.
Edward N. Zalta (1993). Twenty-Five Basic Theorems in Situation and World Theory. Journal of Philosophical Logic 22 (4):385-428.
Claude Laflamme & Marion Scheepers (1999). Combinatorial Properties of Filters and Open Covers for Sets of Real Numbers. Journal of Symbolic Logic 64 (3):1243-1260.
A. W. Moore (1997). The Underdetermination/Indeterminacy Distinction and the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction. Erkenntnis 46 (1):5-32.
John Kulvicki (2005). Perceptual Content, Information, and the Primary/Secondary Quality Distinction. Philosophical Studies 122 (2):103-131.
David Robb (2005). Qualitative Unity and the Bundle Theory. The Monist 88 (4):466-92.
Michael Esfeld & Vincent Lam (2011). Ontic Structural Realism as a Metaphysics of Objects. In. In Alisa Bokulich & Peter Bokulich (eds.), Scientific Structuralism. Springer Science+Business Media. 143--159.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads48 ( #32,227 of 1,096,515 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #90,211 of 1,096,515 )
How can I increase my downloads?