Styles of rationality

Philosophy of the Social Sciences 25 (1):69-98 (1995)
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Abstract

This article discusses the following: (i) The acceptability of diverse styles of rationality suggests replacing concern for uniqueness with that for coordination, (ii) Popper's lowering of the standard of rationality increases its scope insufficiently, (iii) Bartley's making the standard comprehensive increases its scope excessively, (iv) the pluralist view of rationality as partial (i.e., of Jarvie and Agassi) is better, but its ranking of all rationality eliminates choice of styles, (v) styles diversify the standards of rationality, (viii) rationality is not merely a matter of style, (vi) (vii) diversity raises new, interesting problems, allowing diversity permits reconciling differences better than does the absent unique standard, and (ix) cultural heritage and rationality are complementary.

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Citations of this work

Only going so fast: Philosophies as fashions.John J. Stuhr - 2006 - Journal of Speculative Philosophy 20 (3):147-164.

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References found in this work

Language, truth and reason.Ian Hacking - 1982 - In Martin Hollis & Steven Lukes (eds.), Rationality and Relativism. MIT Press. pp. 48--66.
CCR: A Refutation.J. W. N. Watkins - 1971 - Philosophy 46 (175):56-.
In defense of good reasons.William Berkson - 1990 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 20 (1):84-91.

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