Conditional Ranking Revision

Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (1):237-271 (2012)
Abstract
In the context of a general framework for belief dynamics which interprets revision as doxastic constraint satisfaction, we discuss a proposal for revising quasi-probabilistic belief measures with finite sets of graded conditionals. The belief states are ranking measures with divisible values (generalizing Spohn’s epistemology), and the conditionals are interpreted as ranking constraints. The approach is inspired by the minimal information paradigm and based on the principle-guided canonical construction of a ranking model of the input conditionals. This is achieved by extending techniques known from conditional default reasoning. We give an overview of how it handles different principles for conditional and parallel revision and compare it with similar accounts
Keywords Belief revision  Ranking measures  Conditionals
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    Wolfgang Spohn, Ranking Functions, AGM Style. Internet Festschrift for Peter Gärdenfors.
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