LPAR 2010 Short Paper Proceedings (2010)
|Abstract||Classical modal logics, based on the neighborhood semantics of Scott and Montague, provide a generalization of the familiar normal systems based on Kripke semantics. This paper defines AGM revision operators on several first-order monotonic modal correspondents, where each first-order correspondence language is defined by Marc Pauly’s version of the van Benthem characterization theorem for monotone modal logic. A revision problem expressed in a monotone modal system is translated into first-order logic, the revision is performed, and the new belief set is translated back to the original modal system. An example is provided for the logic of Risky Knowledge that uses modal AGM contraction to construct counter-factual evidence sets in order to investigate robustness of a probability assignment given some evidence set. A proof of correctness is given|
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