A Review of the Lottery Paradox [Book Review]
In William Harper & Gregory Wheeler (eds.), Probability and Inference: Essays in Honour of Henry E. Kyburg, Jr. (2007)
|Abstract||Henry Kyburg’s lottery paradox (1961, p. 197) arises from considering a fair 1000 ticket lottery that has exactly one winning ticket. If this much is known about the execution of the lottery it is therefore rational to accept that one ticket will win. Suppose that an event is very likely if the probability of its occurring is greater than 0.99. On these grounds it is presumed rational to accept the proposition that ticket 1 of the lottery will not win. Since the lottery is fair, it is rational to accept that ticket 2 won’t win either—indeed, it is rational to accept for any individual ticket i of the lottery that ticket i will not win. However, accepting that ticket 1 won’t win, accepting that ticket 2 won’t win, . . . , and accepting that ticket 1000 won’t win entails that it is rational to accept that no ticket will win, which entails that it is rational to accept the contradictory proposition that one ticket wins and no ticket wins|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Jonathan Sutton, How to Mistake a Trivial Fact About Probability for a Substantive Fact About Justified Belief.
Sharon Ryan (1996). The Epistemic Virtues of Consistency. Synthese 109 (2):121-141.
Eugene Mills (2012). Lotteries, Quasi-Lotteries, and Scepticism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (2):335 - 352.
Igor Douven (2007). A Pragmatic Dissolution of Harman's Paradox. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2):326–345.
Igor Douven (2007). A Pragmatic Dissolution of Harman's Paradox. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2):326-345.
Donald Smith (2005). Knowledge and Lotteries. Philosophical Books 46 (2):123-131.
Thomas Kroedel (2012). The Lottery Paradox, Epistemic Justification and Permissibility. Analysis 72 (1):57-60.
Thomas Kroedel (2013). The Permissibility Solution to the Lottery Paradox – Reply to Littlejohn. Logos and Episteme 4 (1):103-111.
By Igor Douven (2008). The Lottery Paradox and Our Epistemic Goal. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (2):204–225.
Clayton Littlejohn (2012). Lotteries, Probabilities, and Permissions. Logos and Episteme 3 (3):509-14.
John Turri & Ori Friedman (forthcoming). Winners and Losers in the Folk Epistemology of Lotteries. In James Beebe (ed.), Advances in Experimental Epistemology.
Added to index2011-08-14
Total downloads30 ( #46,354 of 722,774 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #60,541 of 722,774 )
How can I increase my downloads?