Evidential Probability and Objective Bayesian Epistemology
In Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay & Malcolm Forster (eds.), Handbook of the Philosophy of Statistics. Elsevier (2011)
| Abstract | In this chapter we draw connections between two seemingly opposing approaches to probability and statistics: evidential probability on the one hand and objective Bayesian epistemology on the other | |||||||||
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Darrell P. Rowbottom (2008). On the Proximity of the Logical and 'Objective Bayesian' Interpretations of Probability. Erkenntnis 69 (3):335-349.
Timothy Williamson (1998). Conditionalizing on Knowledge. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (1):89-121.
Richard Swinburne (2002). Introduction to Bayes's Theorem. In Bayes’s Theorem. Oxford Univ Pr.
Jon Williamson (2008). Objective Bayesianism with Predicate Languages. Synthese 163 (3):341 - 356.
Gregory Wheeler (2012). Objective Bayesian Calibration and the Problem of Non-Convex Evidence. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 63 (4):841-850.
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