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  • Gregory Wheeler, Jon Williamson, Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay & Malcolm Forster, Evidential Probability and Objective Bayesian Epistemology.
    In this chapter we draw connections between two seemingly opposing approaches to probability and statistics: evidential probability on the one hand and objective Bayesian epistemology on the other.
    Formal Epistemology, Misc in Epistemology
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  • 111.2Jon Williamson, Evidential Probability, Objective Bayesianism, Non-Monotonicity and System P.
    This paper is a comparison of how first-order Kyburgian Evidential Probability (EP), second-order EP, and objective Bayesian epistemology compare as to the KLM system-P rules for consequence relations and the monotonic / non-monotonic divide.
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  • 102.7Jon Williamson, Objective Bayesian Probabilistic Logic.
    This paper develops connections between objective Bayesian epistemology—which holds that the strengths of an agent’s beliefs should be representable by probabilities, should be calibrated with evidence of empirical probability, and should otherwise be equivocal—and probabilistic logic. After introducing objective Bayesian epistemology over propositional languages, the formalism is extended to handle predicate languages. A rather general probabilistic logic is formulated and then given a natural semantics in terms of objective Bayesian epistemology. The machinery of objective Bayesian nets and objective credal nets (...) is introduced and this machinery is applied to provide a calculus for probabilistic logic that meshes with the objective Bayesian semantics. (shrink)
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  • 99.8Jon Williamson, Objective Bayesian Nets.
    I present a formalism that combines two methodologies: objective Bayesianism and Bayesian nets. According to objective Bayesianism, an agent’s degrees of belief (i) ought to satisfy the axioms of probability, (ii) ought to satisfy constraints imposed by background knowledge, and (iii) should otherwise be as non-committal as possible (i.e. have maximum entropy). Bayesian nets offer an efficient way of representing and updating probability functions. An objective Bayesian net is a Bayesian net representation of the maximum entropy probability function.
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  • 88.2Timothy Williamson (1998). Conditionalizing on Knowledge. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (1):89-121.
    A theory of evidential probability is developed from two assumptions:(1) the evidential probability of a proposition is its probability conditional on the total evidence;(2) one's total evidence is one's total knowledge. Evidential probability is distinguished from both subjective and objective probability. Loss as well as gain of evidence is permitted. Evidential probability is embedded within epistemic logic by means of possible worlds semantics for modal logic; this allows a natural theory of higher-order probability to be developed. In particular, it is (...) emphasized that it is sometimes uncertain which propositions are part of one's total evidence; some surprising implications of this fact are drawn out. (shrink)
    Evidence and Knowledge in Epistemology
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  • 86.8Jon Williamson, Philosophies of Probability: Objective Bayesianism and its Challenges.
    This chapter presents an overview of the major interpretations of probability followed by an outline of the objective Bayesian interpretation and a discussion of the key challenges it faces. I discuss the ramifications of interpretations of probability and objective Bayesianism for the philosophy of mathematics in general.
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  • 85.8Jon Williamson (2008). Objective Bayesianism with Predicate Languages. Synthese 163 (3).
    Objective Bayesian probability is often defined over rather simple domains, e.g., finite event spaces or propositional languages. This paper investigates the extension of objective Bayesianism to first-order logical languages. It is argued that the objective Bayesian should choose a probability function, from all those that satisfy constraints imposed by background knowledge, that is closest to a particular frequency-induced probability function which generalises the λ = 0 function of Carnap’s continuum of inductive methods.
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  • 83.2Jon Williamson, Epistemic Complexity From an Objective Bayesian Perspective.
    Evidence can be complex in various ways: e.g., it may exhibit structural complexity, containing information about causal, hierarchical or logical structure as well as empirical data, or it may exhibit combinatorial complexity, containing a complex combination of kinds of information. This paper examines evidential complexity from the point of view of Bayesian epistemology, asking: how should complex evidence impact on an agent’s degrees of belief? The paper presents a high-level overview of an objective Bayesian answer: it presents the objective Bayesian (...) norms concerning the relation between evidence and degrees of belief, and goes on to show how evidence of causal, hierarchical and logical structure lead to natural constraints on degrees of belief. The objective Bayesian network formalism is presented, and it is shown how this formalism can be used to handle both kinds of evidential complexity—structural complexity and combinatorial complexity. (shrink)
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  • 81.0Stephan Hartmann & Jan Sprenger (forthcoming). Bayesian Epistemology. In Duncan Pritchard & Sven Bernecker (eds.), Routledge Companion to Epistemology. Routledge.
    Bayesian epistemology addresses epistemological problems with the help of the mathematical theory of probability. It turns out that the probability calculus is especially suited to represent degrees of belief (credences) and to deal with questions of belief change, confirmation, evidence, justification, and coherence. Compared to the informal discussions in traditional epistemology, Bayesian epis- temology allows for a more precise and fine-grained analysis which takes the gradual aspects of these central epistemological notions into account. Bayesian epistemology therefore complements traditional epistemology; it (...) does not re- place it or aim at replacing it. (shrink)
    Evidence and Knowledge in Epistemology
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  • 80.0Patrick Maher (2010). Bayesian Probability. Synthese 172 (1).
    Bayesian decision theory is here construed as explicating a particular concept of rational choice and Bayesian probability is taken to be the concept of probability used in that theory. Bayesian probability is usually identified with the agent’s degrees of belief but that interpretation makes Bayesian decision theory a poor explication of the relevant concept of rational choice. A satisfactory conception of Bayesian decision theory is obtained by taking Bayesian probability to be an explicatum for inductive probability given the agent’s evidence.
    Philosophy of Probability
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  • 76.1John L. Pollock, Problems for Bayesian Epistemology.
    In the past, few mainstream epistemologists have endorsed Bayesian epistemology, feeling that it fails to capture the complex structure of epistemic cognition. The defenders of Bayesian epistemology have tended to be probability theorists rather than epistemologists, and I have always suspected they were more attracted by its mathematical elegance than its epistemological realism. But recently Bayesian epistemology has gained a following among younger mainstream epistemologists. I think it is time to rehearse some of the simpler but still quite devastating objections (...) to Bayesian epistemology. Most of these objections are familiar, but have never been adequately addressed by the Bayesians. (shrink)
    Bayesian Reasoning, Misc in Philosophy of Probability
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