David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60 (1):79-100 (2009)
This essay presents results about a deviation from independence measure called focused correlation . This measure explicates the formal relationship between probabilistic dependence of an evidence set and the incremental confirmation of a hypothesis, resolves a basic question underlying Peter Klein and Ted Warfield's ‘truth-conduciveness’ problem for Bayesian coherentism, and provides a qualified rebuttal to Erik Olsson's claim that there is no informative link between correlation and confirmation. The generality of the result is compared to recent programs in Bayesian epistemology that attempt to link correlation and confirmation by utilizing a conditional evidential independence condition. Several properties of focused correlation are also highlighted. Introduction Correlation Measures 2.1 Standard covariance and correlation measures 2.2 The Wayne–Shogenji measure 2.3 Interpreting correlation measures 2.4 Correlation and evidential independence Focused Correlation Conclusion Appendix CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this?
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References found in this work BETA
Peter Klein & Ted A. Warfield (1994). What Price Coherence? Analysis 54 (3):129 - 132.
Wayne C. Myrvold (1996). Bayesianism and Diverse Evidence: A Reply to Andrew Wayne. Philosophy of Science 63 (4):661-665.
Tomoji Shogenji (2007). Why Does Coherence Appear Truth-Conducive? Synthese 157 (3):361 - 372.
Citations of this work BETA
Jonah N. Schupbach (2011). New Hope for Shogenji's Coherence Measure. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 62 (1):125-142.
Gregory Wheeler & Richard Scheines (2013). Coherence and Confirmation Through Causation. Mind 122 (485):135-170.
Clark Glymour (2015). Probability and the Explanatory Virtues. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (3):591-604.
Michael Schippers (2014). Coherence, Striking Agreement, and Reliability. Synthese 191 (15):3661-3684.
Arthur Paul Pedersen & Gregory Wheeler (2014). Demystifying Dilation. Erkenntnis 79 (6):1305-1342.
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