Graduate studies at Western
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 63 (4):841-850 (2012)
|Abstract||Jon Williamson's Objective Bayesian Epistemology relies upon a calibration norm to constrain credal probability by both quantitative and qualitative evidence. One role of the calibration norm is to ensure that evidence works to constrain a convex set of probability functions. This essay brings into focus a problem for Williamson's theory when qualitative evidence specifies non-convex constraints.|
|Keywords||Bayesian epistemology convex sets probability|
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