The Devils in the Details: a Response to Kiverstein's 'Minimal Sense of Self, Temporality and the Brain'

While remaining in broad agreement with the overall position developed and defended by Kiverstein, I identify and discuss what I take to be a number of problems with the details of the argument. These concern the claim that a certain temporal structure to conscious experience is necessary for there to be a minimal sense of self, the alleged ubiquitous presence in experience of a minimal sense of self, and the claim that the distinction between the constitutive background conditions and the core realiser of a given experience is ultimately unsustainable.
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