Bootstrapping Normativity

Philosophy and Technology 24 (1):35-53 (2011)
Abstract
We compare the role of Cartesian assumptions in the symbol grounding problem and in the Myth of the Given: We argue that the Sellars–McDowell critique of the Myth of the Given and, in particular, its use of the concept of normativity can provide useful resources for responding to the symbol grounding problem. We also describe the concepts of normativity at work in computer science and cognitive science: We argue that normative concepts are pervasive in the sciences and that, in particular, McDowell’s dichotomy between the normative space of reasons and the realm of nature is somewhat problematic
Keywords Myth of the Given  Cognitive Science  Symbol Grounding Problem  normativity
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 11,399
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Stevan Harnad (1990). The Symbol Grounding Problem. Philosophical Explorations 42:335-346.
John McDowell (1994). Mind and World. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

View all 10 references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Similar books and articles
Ruth Chang (2009). Voluntarist Reasons and the Sources of Normativity. In David Sobel & Steven Wall (eds.), Reasons for Action. Cambridge University Press.
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2011-01-01

Total downloads

42 ( #41,140 of 1,102,971 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

3 ( #120,763 of 1,102,971 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.