Brandom on practical reason

Philosophical Quarterly 53 (213):566–572 (2003)
Robert Brandom claims that language expressing pro-attitudes makes explicit proprieties of practical inference. This thesis is untenable, especially given certain premises which Brandom himself endorses. Pro-attitude vocabulary has the wrong grammatical structure; other parts of vocabulary do the job he ascribes to pro-attitude vocabulary; the thesis introduces implausible differences between the inferential consequences of desires and intentions, and distorts the interpretation of conditional statements. Rather, I suggest, logical vocabulary can make proprieties of practical inference explicit, just as the inferentialist says it can for theoretical inference.
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DOI 10.1111/1467-9213.00332
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Heath White (2011). 'Ought': The Correct Intention Account. Philosophical Explorations 12 (3):297-317.

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