Causal nominalism
In Toby Handfield (ed.), Dispositions and Causes. Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press ; (2009)
| Abstract | The causal theory of properties is standardly combined with a realist's ontology of universals or tropes. In this paper, I consider an uncharted alternative – a nominalist causal theory of properties. I discuss advantages and disadvantages of the resulting theory of properties, and explore the Rylean understanding of causal powers that emerges. | |||||||||
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Robert A. Wilson (1993). Against A Priori Arguments for Individualism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 74 (1):60-79.
Robert Audi (2010). Moral Perception and Moral Knowledge. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 84 (1):79-97.
Sean Crawford (2003). Relational Properties, Causal Powers and Psychological Laws. Acta Analytica 18 (30-31):193-216.
Toby Handfield (2008). Humean Dispositionalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (1):113-126.
Jürgen Schröder (2007). Mental Causation and the Supervenience Argument. Erkenntnis 67 (2):221 - 237.
Ann Whittle (2003). The Causal Theory of Properties. Dissertation, UCL
Brandon N. Towl (2010). The Individuation of Causal Powers by Events (and Consequences of the Approach). Metaphysica 11 (1):49-61.
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