Conflicting parts of happiness in Aristotle's ethics

Ethics 105 (2):258-283 (1995)
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Abstract

This article examines happiness as an activity, modeled on pleasure in NE 10, 1-5. Aristotle is not proposing a choice, but defining the formal nature of happiness. Contemplation, as the activity of wisdom, constitutes happiness in the strict and formal sense. It has all the attributes of happiness, highest, most continuous, most pleasant, most self-sufficient, leisured, and an end in itself. Practical virtues are formally secondary, as including elements outside the activity of the best part and having leisure as their end. Thus, amusements, practical activities and contemplation are integrated in the life of the sage, the contribution of each formally defined

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