Curiosity was Framed

Abstract
This paper explores the nature of curiosity from an epistemological point of view. First it motivates this exploration by explaining why epistemologists do and should care about what curiosity is. Then it surveys the relevant literature and develops a particular approach
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References found in this work BETA
Guy Axtell (1997). Recent Work on Virtue Epistemology. American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (1):1 - 26.
Jason Baehr (2009). Is There a Value Problem? In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford University Press. 42--59.
Jason S. Baehr (2006). Character in Epistemology. Philosophical Studies 128 (3):479--514.

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