David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophers' Imprint 10 (12) (2010)
Dispositional compatibilists argue that a proper understanding of our abilities vindicates both compatibilism and the principle of Alternate Possibilities (the claim that the ability to do otherwise is required for freedom and moral responsibility). In this paper, I argue that this is mistaken. Both analyses of dispositions and abilities should distinguish between local and global dispositions or abilities. Once this distinction is in place, we see that neither thesis is established by an analysis of abilities
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Yuri Cath (2015). Revisionary Intellectualism and Gettier. Philosophical Studies 172 (1):7-27.
John Maier (2013). The Agentive Modalities. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (3):113-134.
Michael McKenna (2013). Source Compatibilism and That Pesky Ability to Do Otherwise: Comments on Dana Nelkin's Making Sense of Freedom and Responsibility. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 163 (1):105-116.
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