David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (2):279-300 (2012)
It is common to hear talk of the aim of belief and to find philosophers appealing to that aim for numerous explanatory purposes. What belief 's aim explains depends, of course, on what that aim is. Many hold that it is somehow related to truth, but there are various ways in which one might specify belief 's aim using the notion of truth. In this article, by considering whether they can account for belief 's standard of correctness and the epistemic norms governing belief, I argue against certain prominent specifications of belief 's aim given in terms of truth, and advance a neglected alternative
|Keywords||aim of belief truth evidence normativity|
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References found in this work BETA
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Citations of this work BETA
Anthony Robert Booth (2015). Belief is Contingently Involuntary. Ratio 29 (1):n/a-n/a.
J. Adam Carter, Benjamin W. Jarvis & Katherine Rubin (2015). Varieties of Cognitive Achievement. Philosophical Studies 172 (6):1603-1623.
Stephen Ingram (2015). After Moral Error Theory, After Moral Realism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 53 (2):227-248.
Conor McHugh (2013). Normativism and Doxastic Deliberation. Analytic Philosophy 54 (4):447-465.
Daniel Whiting (2013). The Good and the True (or the Bad and the False). Philosophy 8 (2):219-242.
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