Does belief aim (only) at the truth?

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (2):279-300 (2012)
It is common to hear talk of the aim of belief and to find philosophers appealing to that aim for numerous explanatory purposes. What belief's aim explains depends, of course, on what that aim is. Many hold that it is somehow related to truth, but there are various ways in which one might specify belief's aim using the notion of truth. In this article, by considering whether they can account for belief's standard of correctness and the epistemic norms governing belief, I argue against certain prominent specifications of belief's aim given in terms of truth, and advance a neglected alternative.
Keywords aim of belief  truth  evidence  normativity
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2012.01421.x
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References found in this work BETA
Nishi Shah (2003). How Truth Governs Belief. Philosophical Review 112 (4):447-482.

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Citations of this work BETA
Stephen Ingram (2015). After Moral Error Theory, After Moral Realism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 53 (2):227-248.

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