Explanation as a guide to induction

Philosophers' Imprint 5 (2):1-29 (2005)
It is notoriously difficult to spell out the norms of inductive reasoning in a neat set of rules. I explore the idea that explanatory considerations are the key to sorting out the good inductive inferences from the bad. After defending the crucial explanatory virtue of stability, I apply this approach to a range of inductive inferences, puzzles, and principles such as the Raven and Grue problems, and the significance of varied data and random sampling.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 16,667
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Stephen R. Grimm (2010). The Goal of Explanation. Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science 41 (4):337-344.
Roger White (2010). You Just Believe That Because…. Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):573-615.
Stephen R. Grimm (2010). The Goal of Explanation. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (4):337-344.

View all 9 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

122 ( #21,925 of 1,726,249 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

13 ( #53,688 of 1,726,249 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.