Explanation as a guide to induction
Philosophers' Imprint 5 (2):1-29 (2005)
| Abstract | It is notoriously difficult to spell out the norms of inductive reasoning in a neat set of rules. I explore the idea that explanatory considerations are the key to sorting out the good inductive inferences from the bad. After defending the crucial explanatory virtue of stability, I apply this approach to a range of inductive inferences, puzzles, and principles such as the Raven and Grue problems, and the significance of varied data and random sampling. | |||||||||
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John D. Norton (2010). There Are No Universal Rules for Induction. Philosophy of Science 77 (5):765-777.
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