David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):270-290 (2002)
Aristotle's requirement that virtuous actions be chosen for themselves is typically interpreted, in Kantian terms, as taking virtuous action to have intrinsic rather than consequentialist value. This raises problems about how to reconcile Aristotle's requirement with (a) the fact that virtuous actions typically aim at ends beyond themselves (usually benefits to others); and (b) Aristotle's apparent requirement that everything (including virtuous action) be chosen for the sake of eudaimonia. I offer an alternative interpretation, based on Aristotle's account of loving a friend for herself, according to which choosing a virtuous action for itself involves choosing it on account of those features of it that make it the kind of action it is, where these features include its intended consequences (such as the benefits it seeks to provide to others). I then suggest that Aristotle may take these consequences (including benefits to others) as contributing (and contributing non-instrumentally) to the agent's own eudaimonia, and that there is no conflict here with Aristotle's view that eudaimonia is an activity of the soul. For just as my activity of teaching is actualized in my students (provided they learn from me), so too my virtuous activity can be actualized in its beneficiaries. If this is right, then Aristotle's view is far from the Stoic (and proto-Kantian) view often attributed to him
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Marta Jimenez (2016). Aristotle on Becoming Virtuous by Doing Virtuous Actions. Phronesis 61 (1):3-32.
Anne Baril (2013). The Role of Welfare in Eudaimonism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 51 (4):511-535.
Thomas Hurka (2010). Underivative Duty: Prichard on Moral Obligation. Social Philosophy and Policy 27 (2):111-134.
Similar books and articles
Robert Heinaman (1993). Rationality, Eudaimonia and Kakodaimonia in Aristotle. Phronesis 38 (1):31 - 56.
David Charles (1999). Aristotle on Well-Being and Intellectual Contemplation: David Charles. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 73 (1):205–223.
Thomas Sherman (2008). Wisdom and Action Guidance in the Agent-Based Virtue Ethics of Aristotle. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 80 (4):481 - 506.
Howard J. Curzer (2002). Aristotle's Painful Path to Virtue. Journal of the History of Philosophy 40 (2):141-162.
Liezl van Zyl (2011). Right Action and the Non-Virtuous Agent. Journal of Applied Philosophy 28 (1):80-92.
Michael Wiitala (2009). Contemplation and Action Within the Context of the Kalon. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 83:173-182.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads84 ( #49,509 of 1,797,096 )
Recent downloads (6 months)6 ( #135,677 of 1,797,096 )
How can I increase my downloads?