Evidential Symmetry and Mushy Credence

In T. Szabo Gendler & J. Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology. Oxford University Press. 161-186 (2009)
Abstract
the symmetry of our evidential situation. If our confidence is best modeled by a standard probability function this means that we are to distribute our subjective probability or credence sharply and evenly over possibilities among which our evidence does not discriminate. Once thought to be the central principle of probabilistic reasoning by great..
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David Christensen (2010). Rational Reflection. Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):121-140.

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