David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Ratio 25 (2):216-230 (2012)
Knowledge seems to be a good thing, or at least better than epistemic states that fall short of it, such as true belief. Understanding too seems to be a good thing, perhaps better even than knowledge. In a number of recent publications, Duncan Pritchard tries to account for the value of understanding by claiming that understanding is a cognitive achievement and that achievements in general are valuable. In this paper, I argue that coming to understand something need not be an achievement, and so Pritchard's explanation of understanding's value fails. Next, I point out that Pritchard's is just one of many attempts to account for the value of an epistemic state – whether it be understanding, knowledge, or whatever – by appeal to the notion of achievement or, more generally, the notion of success because of ability. Tentatively, I offer reasons to be sceptical about the prospects of any such account.
|Keywords||epistemic value epistemic normativity virtue-theory understanding knowledge|
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Citations of this work BETA
Clayton Littlejohn (2014). Fake Barns and False Dilemmas. Episteme 11 (4):369-389.
Stephen R. Grimm (2012). “The Value of Understanding”. Philosophy Compass 7 (2):103-117.
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