Analysis 50 (1):33-35 (1990)
|Abstract||Analysis shows that statements of ability are disguised conditionals. More exactly, the correct analysis of 'X could have done A' is 'If X h decided (chosen, willed ...) to do A, X would have done A'. Therefore having acted freely--having been able to act otherwise than one fact did--is compatible with determinism (with the causal determination of one's acts)|
|Keywords||Compatibilism Ethics Free Will Van Inwagen, P|
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