In defense of deontology and Kant: A reply to Van staveren
Review of Political Economy 21 (2):315-323 (2009)
| Abstract | In this note, I respond to a recent article by Irene van Staveren (2007), in which she presents a case for virtue ethics, rather than deontology or consequentialism, as the most appropriate ethical foundation for ethics. Rather than taking issue with her positive arguments for virtue ethics, I argue in defense of deontology-or, more specifically, the moral philosophy of Immanuel <span class='Hi'>Kant</span>. I argue that, when properly understood, Kantian ethics should not be associated solely with formal rules and obligation, but that <span class='Hi'>Kant</span>'s moral system can accommodate many of the concerns of virtue ethics, such as social relations, real-world context, and human fallibility, as well as embodying a unique emphasis on human dignity and judgment. | |||||||||
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