David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Review of Political Economy 21 (2):315-323 (2009)
In this note, I respond to a recent article by Irene van Staveren (2007), in which she presents a case for virtue ethics, rather than deontology or consequentialism, as the most appropriate ethical foundation for ethics. Rather than taking issue with her positive arguments for virtue ethics, I argue in defense of deontology-or, more specifically, the moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant. I argue that, when properly understood, Kantian ethics should not be associated solely with formal rules and obligation, but that Kant's moral system can accommodate many of the concerns of virtue ethics, such as social relations, real-world context, and human fallibility, as well as embodying a unique emphasis on human dignity and judgment.
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