Meaning holism and de re ascription
Canadian Journal of Philosophy 38 (4):pp. 575-599 (2008)
| Abstract | According to inferential role semantics (IRS), for an expression to have a particular meaning or express a certain concept is for subjects to be disposed to make, or to treat as proper, certain inferential transitions involving that expression.1 Such a theory of meaning is holistic, since according to it the meaning or concept any given expression possesses or expresses depends on the inferential relations it stands in to other expressions. | |||||||||
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Daniel Whiting (2009). Meaning Holism and De Re Ascription. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 38 (4):575-599.
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