'Ought': The correct intention account

Philosophical Explorations 12 (3):297-317 (2011)
Abstract
“S ought (not) to see to it that p at t” is true iff an intention on the part of S to see to it that p at t is (in) correct. From this truth condition follows an understanding of the conceptual role of ought-claims in practical inference: ought-claims are interchangeable with intentions having the same content. From this conceptual role, it is quite clear why first-person, present-tense ought-judgments, and just those, motivate: failure to be motivated is a failure of rationality. The point and purpose of 'ought' is mainly to express the results of practical reasoning performed on premises held hypothetically, an exercise of which there are many varieties. Our capacity for normative thought and language is a consequence of, and intimately related to, our capacity for practical thought
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References found in this work BETA
John Broome (2001). Normative Practical Reasoning: John Broome. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 75 (1):175–193.

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