David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Dialectica 64 (2):213-224 (2010)
Many philosophers hold that a general norm of truth governs the attitude of believing. In a recent and influential discussion, Krister Bykvist and Anandi Hattiangadi raise a number of serious objections to this view. In this paper, I concede that Bykvist and Hattiangadi's criticisms might be effective against the formulation of the norm of truth that they consider, but suggest that an alternative is available. After outlining that alternative, I argue that it is not vulnerable to objections parallel to those Bykvist and Hattiangadi advance, although it might initially appear to be. In closing, I consider what bearing the preceding discussion has on important questions concerning the natures of believing and of truth
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References found in this work BETA
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Richard A. Moran (2001). Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge. Princeton University Press.
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Citations of this work BETA
Pascal Engel (2013). Doxastic Correctness. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 87 (1):199-216.
Daniel Whiting (2013). The Good and the True (or the Bad and the False). Philosophy 8 (2):219-242.
Alexander Greenberg & Christopher Cowie (2016). Is the Norm on Belief Evaluative? A Response to McHugh. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2):n/a-n/a.
Moti Mizrahi (2012). Does ‘Ought’ Imply ‘Can’ From an Epistemic Point of View? Philosophia 40 (4):829-840.
Benjamin Jarvis (2012). Norms of Intentionality: Norms That Don't Guide. Philosophical Studies 157 (1):1-25.
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