David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Erkenntnis 78 (4):847-867 (2013)
The view that truth is the norm of assertion has fallen out of fashion. The recent trend has been to think that knowledge is the norm of assertion. Objections to the knowledge view proceed almost exclusively by appeal to alleged counterexamples. While it no doubt has a role to play, such a strategy relies on intuitions concerning hypothetical cases, intuitions which might not be shared and which might shift depending on how the relevant cases are fleshed out. In this paper, I reject the knowledge view on principled grounds. More specifically, by appeal to a principle which is motivated independently of the debate over the norms of assertion and which is already accepted by many proponents of the knowledge view, I show the knowledge view to be false while simultaneously accounting for why it might seem to be true. In doing so, I provide a novel defence of the unfashionable truth view
|Keywords||epistemology assertion truth knowledge normativity|
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References found in this work BETA
John Greco (2010). Achieving Knowledge: A Virtue-Theoretic Account of Epistemic Normativity. Cambridge University Press.
Jeremy Fantl (2009). Knowledge in an Uncertain World. Oxford University Press.
Crispin Wright (1992). Truth and Objectivity. Harvard University Press.
Robert B. Brandom (1994). Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment. Harvard University Press.
John Hawthorne (2003). Knowledge and Lotteries. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Daniel Whiting (2015). Truth is the Norm for Assertion: A Reply to Littlejohn. Erkenntnis 80 (6):1245-1253.
Clayton Littlejohn (2014). Know Your Rights: On Warranted Assertion and Truth. Erkenntnis 79 (6):1355-1365.
Casey Rebecca Johnson (2015). Testimony and the Constitutive Norm of Assertion. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (3):356-375.
Ivan Milić (2015). A Note on Existentially Known Assertions. Philosophical Quarterly 65 (261):813-821.
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