Stick to the Facts: On the Norms of Assertion [Book Review]

Erkenntnis 78 (4):847-867 (2013)
Abstract
The view that truth is the norm of assertion has fallen out of fashion. The recent trend has been to think that knowledge is the norm of assertion. Objections to the knowledge view proceed almost exclusively by appeal to alleged counterexamples. While it no doubt has a role to play, such a strategy relies on intuitions concerning hypothetical cases, intuitions which might not be shared and which might shift depending on how the relevant cases are fleshed out. In this paper, I reject the knowledge view on principled grounds. More specifically, by appeal to a principle which is motivated independently of the debate over the norms of assertion and which is already accepted by many proponents of the knowledge view, I show the knowledge view to be false while simultaneously accounting for why it might seem to be true. In doing so, I provide a novel defence of the unfashionable truth view
Keywords epistemology  assertion  truth  knowledge  normativity
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David Owens (2006). Testimony and Assertion. Philosophical Studies 130 (1):105 - 129.
Jennifer Lackey (2011). Assertion and Isolated Second-Hand Knowledge. In Jessica Brown & Herman Cappelen (eds.), Assertion: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press. 251--276.
John Turri (2011). The Express Knowledge Account of Assertion. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (1):37-45.
Rachel McKinnon (2013). The Supportive Reasons Norm of Assertion. American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (2):121-135.
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