Standing up for an affective account of emotion

Philosophical Explorations 9 (3):261-276 (2006)
Abstract
This paper constitutes a defence of an affective account of emotion. I begin by outlining the case for thinking that emotions are just feelings. I also suggest that emotional feelings are not reducible to other kinds of feelings, but rather form a distinct class of feeling state. I then consider a number of common objections that have been raised against affective accounts of emotion, including: (1) the objection that emotion cannot always consist only of feeling because some emotions - for example, indignation and regret - necessarily have a cognitive component (say, the perception of a lost opportunity in the case of regret); (2) the objection that emotion cannot consist only of feeling because in order to explain how emotions have intentional objects we will have to recognise that emotion consists of cognition; and (3) the objection that emotion cannot consist only of feeling because emotion, but not feeling, can be variously assessed or evaluated. However, I demonstrate how an affective account of emotion might be successfully defended against all of the objections that are cited.
Keywords Cognition  Emotion  Feeling  Intentionality  Metaphysics  Phenomenology
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 12,068
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Citations of this work BETA
Similar books and articles
Jennifer Wilkinson (1998). Feeling an Emotion. South African Journal of Philosophy 17 (1):62-74.
Matthew Ratcliffe (2005). William James on Emotion and Intentionality. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 13 (2):179-202.
Peter Goldie (2002). Emotions, Feelings and Intentionality. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (3):235-254.
Uriah Kriegel (2012). Towards a New Feeling Theory of Emotion. European Journal of Philosophy (3):420-442.
Jan Slaby (2008). Affective Intentionality and the Feeling Body. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (4):429-444.
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

127 ( #8,090 of 1,101,833 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

10 ( #24,761 of 1,101,833 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.