Graduate studies at Western
Mind 112 (448):653-683 (2003)
|Abstract||According to the thesis of Strong Predictionism, we typically have stronger evidence for a theory if it was used to predict certain data, than if it was deliberately constructed to accommodate those same data, even if we fully grasp the theory and all the evidence on which it was based. This thesis faces powerful objections and the existing arguments in support of it are seriously flawed. I offer a new defence of Strong Predictionism which overcomes the objections and provides a deeper understanding of the epistemic importance of prediction. I conclude by applying this account to strategies for defending scientific realism.|
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