The epistemic advantage of prediction over accommodation

Mind 112 (448):653-683 (2003)
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Abstract

According to the thesis of Strong Predictionism, we typically have stronger evidence for a theory if it was used to predict certain data, than if it was deliberately constructed to accommodate those same data, even if we fully grasp the theory and all the evidence on which it was based. This thesis faces powerful objections and the existing arguments in support of it are seriously flawed. I offer a new defence of Strong Predictionism which overcomes the objections and provides a deeper understanding of the epistemic importance of prediction. I conclude by applying this account to strategies for defending scientific realism.

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Roger White
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Citations of this work

Scientific Realism.Richard Boyd - 1984 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 21 (1&2):767-791.
Scientific Realism.Anjan Chakravartty - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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References found in this work

The current status of scientific realism.Richard Boyd - 1984 - In J. Leplin (ed.), Scientific Realism. University of California. pp. 195--222.
Dynamics of Theory Change: The Role of Predictions.Stephen G. Brush - 1994 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1994:133 - 145.
What kind of explanation is truth.Michael Levin - 1984 - In J. Leplin (ed.), Scientific Realism. University of California. pp. 124--139.
Maher, mendeleev and bayesianism.Colin Howson & Allan Franklin - 1991 - Philosophy of Science 58 (4):574-585.
Accommodation and prediction.George N. Schlesinger - 1987 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 65 (1):33 – 42.

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