David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Mind 112 (448):653-683 (2003)
According to the thesis of Strong Predictionism, we typically have stronger evidence for a theory if it was used to predict certain data, than if it was deliberately constructed to accommodate those same data, even if we fully grasp the theory and all the evidence on which it was based. This thesis faces powerful objections and the existing arguments in support of it are seriously flawed. I offer a new defence of Strong Predictionism which overcomes the objections and provides a deeper understanding of the epistemic importance of prediction. I conclude by applying this account to strategies for defending scientific realism.
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Citations of this work BETA
David Harker (2008). On the Predilections for Predictions. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (3):429-453.
Samuel Schindler (2014). Novelty, Coherence, and Mendeleev’s Periodic Table. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 45 (1):62-69.
Mario Alai (2014). Novel Predictions and the No Miracle Argument. Erkenntnis 79 (2):297-326.
Kevin McCain (2012). A Predictivist Argument Against Scepticism. Analysis 72 (4):660-665.
Heather Douglas & P. D. Magnus (2013). State of the Field: Why Novel Prediction Matters. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 44 (4):580-589.
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