David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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European Journal of Philosophy 19 (2):281-303 (2011)
Abstract: The ‘feeling theory of emotion’ holds that emotions are to be identified with feelings. An objection commonly made to that theory of emotion has it that emotions cannot be feelings only, as emotions have intentional objects. Jack does not just feel fear, but he feels fear-of-something. To explain this property of emotion we will have to ascribe to emotion a representational structure, and feelings do not have the sought after representational structure. In this paper I seek to defend the feeling theory of emotion against the challenge from the object-directed emotions
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References found in this work BETA
Simon Blackburn (1998/2000). Ruling Passions. Oxford University Press.
Jesse J. Prinz (2004). Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of the Emotions. Oxford University Press.
Martha C. Nussbaum (2001). Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions. Cambridge University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Julien A. Deonna & Fabrice Teroni (2015). Emotions as Attitudes. Dialectica 69 (3):293-311.
Demian Whiting (2012). Are Emotions Perceptual Experiences of Value? Ratio 25 (1):93-107.
Anika Lutz (2015). The Phenomenal Character of Emotional Experience: A Look at Perception Theory. Dialectica 69 (3):313-334.
Christine Tappolet & Mauro Rossi (2015). Emotions and Wellbeing. Topoi 34 (2):461-474.
Michelle Maiese (2014). How Can Emotions Be Both Cognitive and Bodily? Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (4):513-531.
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