Theory Pursuit: Between Discovery and Acceptance

Abstract
Drawing on diverse historical cases, this paper describes and examines various aspects of a modality of scientific appraisal which has remained largely unexplored, theory pursuit. Specifically, it addresses the following issues: the epistemic and pragmatic commitments involved in theory pursuit, including how these differ from those characteristic of theory acceptance; how the research interests of scientists enter into their pursuit decisions; some of the strategies for the refinement and extension of a theory's empirical abilities which typify theory pursuit; and the need to distinguish between individual and community rationality in contexts of pursuit.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 10,273
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Citations of this work BETA
Alex Stewart Davies (2013). Kuhn on Incommensurability and Theory Choice. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 44 (4):571-579.
D. Allchin (1996). Cellular and Theoretical Chimeras: Piecing Together How Cells Process Energy. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 27 (1):31-41.
Similar books and articles
Laurie Anne Whitt (1992). Indices of Theory Promise. Philosophy of Science 59 (4):612-634.
Eric M. Cave (2009). Unsavory Seduction. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (3):235 - 245.
Axel Gelfert (2013). Hume on Curiosity. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 21 (4):711-732.
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2011-05-29

Total downloads

5 ( #209,062 of 1,096,251 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

2 ( #126,669 of 1,096,251 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.