David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 2 (3):319-329 (1981)
It is argued that the common definition of diagnosis as the determination of the nature of a disease is misleading. Many diagnoses are not the names of disease entities. This finding reflects the integral relation of the diagnostic task to the rest of clinical reasoning. Diagnosis has no separate goal of its own, in particular it does not have the goal of determining the nature of a disease. Instead, diagnosis contributes to the general goals of clinical medicine. Any attempt to model diagnostic reasoning abstracted from the rest of clinical reasoning will yield an inadequate representation of diagnosis. Such a distortion of medical reasoning will blind us to whatever implications an adequate epistemology of medicine may have for an understanding of the relation between theoretical and practical knowledge in other contexts.
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References found in this work BETA
Caroline Whitbeck (1977). Causation in Medicine: The Disease Entity Model. Philosophy of Science 44 (4):619-637.
Citations of this work BETA
S. Scott Graham (2011). Dis-Ease or Disease? Ontological Rarefaction in the Medical-Industrial Complex. Journal of Medical Humanities 32 (3):167-186.
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