Williamson on justification

Philosophical Studies 138 (2):161 - 168 (2008)
Abstract
Timothy Williamson has a marvelously precise account of epistemic justification in terms of knowledge and probability. I argue that the account runs aground on certain cases involving the probability values 0 and 1.
Keywords Epistemology  Justification  Evidentialism  Williamson  Probability  Bayesianism  Probability
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References found in this work BETA
Earl Conee & Richard Feldman (2008). Evidence. In Quentin Smith (ed.), Epistemology: New Essays. Oxford University Press.
John Earman (1993). Underdetermination, Realism, and Reason. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 18 (1):19-38.
Richard Feldman (1988). Having Evidence. In. In D. F. Austin (ed.), Philosophical Analysis. Kluwer Academic Publishers. 83--104.
Richard Fumerton (2004). Epistemic Probability. Philosophical Issues 14 (1):149–164.

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