Williamson on justification
Philosophical Studies 138 (2):161 - 168 (2008)
| Abstract | Timothy Williamson has a marvelously precise account of epistemic justification in terms of knowledge and probability. I argue that the account runs aground on certain cases involving the probability values 0 and 1. | |||||||||
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