Associative substitutional semantics and quantified modal logic

Studia Logica 94 (1):105 - 138 (2010)
The paper presents an alternative substitutional semantics for first-order modal logic which, in contrast to traditional substitutional (or truth-value) semantics, allows for a fine-grained explanation of the semantical behavior of the terms from which atomic formulae are composed. In contrast to denotational semantics, which is inherently reference-guided, this semantics supports a non-referential conception of modal truth and does not give rise to the problems which pertain to the philosophical interpretation of objectual domains (concerning, e.g., possibilia or trans-world identity). The paper also proposes the notion of modality de nomine as an alternative to the denotational notion of modality de re.
Keywords first-order logic  modal logic  philosophy of quantified modal logic  predication  substitutional quantification  truth-value semantics
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References found in this work BETA
Bertrand Russell (2005). On Denoting. Mind 114 (456):873 - 887.
Saul A. Kripke (1975). Outline of a Theory of Truth. Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):690-716.
Williamson Timothy (1998). Bare Possibilia. Erkenntnis 48 (2/3):257--73.

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