David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):87 – 108 (2009)
Elsewhere, I proposed a libertarian-based account of freedom and moral blameworthiness which like Harry Frankfurt's 1969 account rejects the principle of alternative possibilities (which I call, Frankfurt-friendly libertarianism). In this paper I develop this account further (a) by responding to an important objection to it raised by Carlos Moya; (b) by exploring the question why, if unavoidability per se does not exonerate from blame, the Frankfurt-friendly libertarian is justified in exculpating an agent under determinism; (c) by arguing that some main compatibilist alternatives to the account are unsatisfactory; and finally (d) by defending it against a general criticism of certain libertarian theories made by Derk Pereboom
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References found in this work BETA
Robert H. Kane (1996). The Significance of Free Will. Oxford University Press.
Derk Pereboom (2001). Living Without Free Will. Cambridge University Press.
John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza (1998). Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility. Cambridge University Press.
Timothy O'Connor (2000). Persons and Causes: The Metaphysics of Free Will. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Robert Lockie (2014). Three Recent Frankfurt Cases. Philosophia 42 (4):1005-1032.
Nadine Elzein (2013). Pereboom's Frankfurt Case and Derivative Culpability. Philosophical Studies 166 (3):553-573.
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