David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):87 – 108 (2009)
Elsewhere, I proposed a libertarian-based account of freedom and moral blameworthiness which like Harry Frankfurt's 1969 account rejects the principle of alternative possibilities (which I call, Frankfurt-friendly libertarianism). In this paper I develop this account further (a) by responding to an important objection to it raised by Carlos Moya; (b) by exploring the question why, if unavoidability per se does not exonerate from blame, the Frankfurt-friendly libertarian is justified in exculpating an agent under determinism; (c) by arguing that some main compatibilist alternatives to the account are unsatisfactory; and finally (d) by defending it against a general criticism of certain libertarian theories made by Derk Pereboom
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References found in this work BETA
Bernard Berofsky (1987). Freedom From Necessity: The Metaphysical Basis of Responsibility. Routledge.
Sarah Buss & Lee Overton (eds.) (2002). Contours of Agency: Essays on Themes From Harry Frankfurt. MIT Press, Bradford Books.
John Martin Fischer (2007). The Importance of Frankfurt-Style Argument. Philosophical Quarterly 57 (228):464–471.
Harry G. Frankfurt (1969). Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility. Journal of Philosophy 66 (3):829-39.
Carl Ginet (2007). An Action Can Be Both Uncaused and Up to the Agent. In Lumer (ed.), Intentionality, Deliberation, and Autonomy. Ashgate. 243--255.
Citations of this work BETA
Nadine Elzein (2013). Pereboom's Frankfurt Case and Derivative Culpability. Philosophical Studies 166 (3):553-573.
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