Can Pyrrhonists Act Normally?

Philosophical Explorations 15 (3):277-289 (2012)
Abstract
Pyrrhonism is the view that we should suspend all our beliefs in order to be rational and reach peace of mind. One of the main objections against this view is that it makes action impossible. One cannot suspend all beliefs and act normally at once. Yet, the question is: What is it about actions that they require beliefs? This issue has hardly been clarified in the literature. This is a bad situation, for if the objection fails and it turns out that the Pyrrhonists found a way to secure peace of mind, we better know the details. In the following, I take up this systematic query and show how the objection can be made precise. Despite Sextus Empiricus? ingenious appearance/reality distinction, which is to ensure Pyrrhonism in this, I eventually argue that a life by appearances is quite unlike a normal life
Keywords agnosticism
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 10,747
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Sarah Buss (1999). What Practical Reasoning Must Be If We Act for Our Own Reasons. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (4):399 – 421.

View all 11 references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Similar books and articles
Ernest Lepore (2004). A Tall Tale. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (Supplement):3-28.
Adrian Kuzminski (2007). Pyrrhonism and the Mādhyamaka. Philosophy East and West 57 (4):482-511.
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2012-07-25

Total downloads

30 ( #57,012 of 1,098,834 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

4 ( #79,379 of 1,098,834 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.