Faith and Philosophy 29 (1):23-41 (2009)
|Abstract||Many believe that objective morality requires a theistic foundation. I maintain that there are sui generis objective ethical facts that do not reduce to natural or supernatural facts. On my view, objective morality does not require an external foundation of any kind. After explaining my view, I defend it against a variety of objections posed by William Wainwright, William Lane Craig, and J. P. Moreland.|
|Keywords||moral realism Wainwright Moreland William Craig meta-ethics theism|
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