Regress Argument Reconstruction

Argumentation 26 (4):489-503 (2012)
Abstract
If an argument can be reconstructed in at least two different ways, then which reconstruction is to be preferred? In this paper I address this problem of argument reconstruction in terms of Ryle’s infinite regress argument against the view that knowledge-how requires knowledge-that. First, I demonstrate that Ryle’s initial statement of the argument does not fix its reconstruction as it admits two, structurally different reconstructions. On the basis of this case and infinite regress arguments generally, I defend a revisionary take on argument reconstruction: argument reconstruction is mainly to be ruled by charity (viz. by general criteria which arguments have to fulfil in order to be good arguments) rather than interpretation.
Keywords Infinite regress  Argument  Reconstruction  Charity  Interpretation
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References found in this work BETA
D. M. Armstrong (1974). Infinite Regress Arguments and the Problem of Universals. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 52 (3):191 – 201.
E. W. Beth (1952). Reviews. [REVIEW] British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 2 (8):159-160.
Romane Clark (1988). Vicious Infinite Regress Arguments. Philosophical Perspectives 2:369-380.
Timothy Joseph Day (1987). Infinite Regress Arguments. Philosophical Papers 16 (2):155-164.

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